Uncertain outcomes

The uprising in Kyrgyzstan represents the largest political development in Central Asia since Sting played a concert for the daughter of Uzbek dictator Islam Karimov. All kidding aside, the spontaneous rebellion that overthrew the established government is likely to make regional players reconsider their positions, possibly jeopardize the status of the U.S. military base (but not likely – this is not a huge focal point of opposition nor a major issue on the ground) and could lead to sweeping changes for the mountainous republic – or a slow retreat toward authoritarianism. At the moment the future is as wide as the steppes that buffet the countryside, but this won't likely last for long. Bishkek has been looted (pictures), the prime minister has resigned and opposition forces have formed an interim government. President Kurmanbek Bakiev, however, has vanished – presumably to the south of the country – and refused to resign, claiming he is still in control.

There are a few ways this could play out.

Kyrgyzstan will undoubtedly be contested in part of the region's New Great Game. China, Russia and the U.S. all have stakes here, and backroom dealings around Manas Air Base are likely why the Kyrgryz parliament essentially rescinded its original vote to close it in 2009. The U.S. will ensure its retention. Eleven hundred NATO soldiers are not going anywhere any time soon. This represents an opportunity for China to fill a vacuum it has left relatively untapped. While Chinese companies explore Africa with fervor, they have neglected emerging on the Central Asian energy scene. The cultism surrounding hydroelectric power in neighboring Tajikistan gives an idea of how important energy independence is in a region where oil smuggling is still a career. China could use this as an effective in, but it would be a blatant attempt to undermine Russia's established sphere of influence. Indeed, Russia has historically used issues such as commodity prices as leverage in disputes in ex-Soviet republics, and Bakiev did not demonstrate the resistance that Belarus' Lukashenko is willing to muster. That Kyrgyzstan was excluded from a Russian trade agreement, thus increasing duties on oil, shortly before utility price hikes in the nation is evidence to some observers of Russia punishing Bakiev for his acquiescence to U.S. demands in regards to Manas. Putin has since recognized the opposition government, and a Russian official intimated that Russian opinions on Manas remain unchanged. That Russia has dispatched two companies of paratroopers to protect Russian citizens and promised opposition leader Rosa Otunbayev with humanitarian aid clearly shows where Russia has its eyes.

The interim government, spearheaded by a social democrat and former foreign minister, shows promise. If it allows open and fair elections, allows for the re-opening of previously banned newspapers and stops the over-handed oppression of the deeply religious it will stand a chance. Of course, negotiating down utility prices will be its litmus test – one that could push it more toward Russia. Revolutionaries named Rosa may not have good fortune, but Otunbayeva seems to be well positioned to steer the nation toward greater democracy and transparency. Bakiev's nepotism will be all but erased, which leaves us with a trying question – what is Bakiev's next move? Ferried away to the south – his ancestral home and base of support – he could mount an armed resistance. This is highly unlikely, but Bakiev will likely leverage the country's long-stand north-south divide to his benefit, a divide that at least one prominent Kyrgyzstan observer and anthropologist suggests has been artificially inflated by those in power to maintain their hegemony. In Kyrgyzstan's world of clan politics, this is not outside the realm of possibility in the least. The opposition, too, could try to oust Bakiev, but this would be a dangerous proposition. Claiming to hold four of seven regions is likely sufficient for now – actually mounting an invasion against Bakiev's territory would be a gamble for the revolutionary government.

More than likely Bakiev will remain an ambiguous, neutered force, but the ensuing stalemate does threaten further violence. While we're certainly unlikely to see stretches of violence as pervasive as the horrific Tajik civil war of the '90s, the Kyrgyz people must remain calm and vigilant to guarantee that violence does not become the de facto way of solving disputes. Bakiev must concede defeat, or at least attempt to re-enter politics through legitimate channels, such as a coming election (assuming the interim government honors such an idea). Any other option would only further inflame the sensibilities of an already fragile situation.

Hunting Central Asia's phantoms

The U.S. is set to open a $5.5 million anti-terror training facility in Kyrgyzstan's Batken province, Eurasianet reports. The center, which will match a similar, extant Russian effort, is a continuation of American policy in supporting the Central Asian state in its crusade against perceived terrorist threats. Yet aid should not have an exclusively anti-terrorist purpose. If conditions in Kyrgyzstan are to improve and terror threats are to be stymied, infrastructure development and government transparency must be focal points.

Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev raised the specter of an Islamic insurrection following a series of small-scale clashes last year. Tajikistan witnessed similar problems in 2009, although the violence is a far cry from the scale reached during the height of the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan's raids of the early 2000s. Bakiev, however, must not take a page from Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov's playbook. Karimov, worried about the expansion of the IMU, engaged in an anti-opposition campaign that jailed anyone remotely too Islamic, including members of Hizb ut-Tahir, an international secret society devoted toward establishing a global Sunni caliphate through nonviolent means. Veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid speculated that had Islamic movements been allowed in Uzbekistan's political mainstream instead of actively persecuted, there would have been less room for armed Islamic opposition to be legitimized.

There are signs Bakiev, who was initially hailed as a democratic reformer in the wake of the Tulip Revolutin, may already be doing this. Bakiev has used this specter in part to increase his control over state security apparatuses, while restructuring the government to afford him the power to dissolve parliament as necessary. These have coincided with a spate of violence previously unseen in the republic. Journalists and opposition members have become victims of brutal attacks, some of which have proven fatal. Of recent note is the case of Gennady Pavyluk, an ethnic Russian Kyrgyz journalist who was thrown from the sixth floor of an apartment building in neighboring Kazakhstan.

For its part, the proposed base opening represents no shift in U.S. policy. When Russia's bribes threatened the closure of the Manas Air Base, Obama wrote Bakiev a letter praising his contributions to the war on terror – yet his own domestic abuses are seldom mentioned by the U.S. administration. While State Department officials have acknowledged some human-rights violations, the government has taken few active steps in denouncing them. Even so, pressuring Bakiev to change course through incentives with strings attached would likely just push the nation more toward the Russian sphere of influence.

To complicate matters, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 forced a politically rooted realignment of irrigation channels and power grids in the former Soviet republics, leading to the rapid desertification of the Aral Sea in the 1990s and creating power struggles that have left swaths of people periodically in the dark. Energy woes and water scarcity, compounded by endemic corruption and a lack of basic education and healthcare, could lead to serious destabilization in neighboring Tajikistan, a conclusion recently reached by the International Crisis Group and the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw.

Kyrgyzstan must be prepared to deal with an influx of refugees across its porously bordered Ferghana Valley should that occur, while simultaneously shielding its own populace from the possibility of state failure. Doing this will require constructive foreign aid, government openness and infrastructure improvement, all of which will continue to elude the Central Asian republic should it keep chasing ghosts, be they among its urban civil society or in its rural mosques.

For the benefit of Kyrgyzstan and regional security, international efforts must be made to focus on civilian aid and infrastructure improvement. The U.S. must focus less on countering Russian defensive contributions tit-for-tat, and instead on distributing to Kyrgyzstan the medical, educational and utility-repair and construction resources necessary to ensure a stable civil society. Such improvements will elevate the standard of living while undermining Islamist recruiting clarions. Any long-lasting, significant effort will require government initiative and support. Bakiev must allow for the proliferation of peaceful Islam, which has experienced a noted resurgence in the Central Asian republics since the fall of the Iron Curtain. The democratic entrance of the Islamic Renaissance Party in the political dialog of Tajikistan should be evidence of Islam's possible integration into politics – yet it took a vicious civil war to illustrate this to the Tajik opposition. Hopefully Bakiev will not continue wielding such a heavy hand in coming years, lest his policies provide the breeding ground for an inchoate insurrection.